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Abstract
Data mining services require accurate input data for their results to be meaningful, but
privacy concerns may influence users to provide spurious information. To encourage users to
provide correct inputs, we recently proposed a data distortion scheme for association rule min-
ing that simultaneously provides both privacy to the user and accuracy in the mining results.
However, mining the distorted database can be orders of magnitude more time-consuming as
compared to mining the original database. In this paper, we address this issue and demonstrate
that by (a) generalizing the distortion process to perform symbol-specific distortion, (b) ap-
propriately chooosing the distortion parameters, and (c) applying a variety of optimizations in
the reconstruction process, runtime efficiencies that are well within an order of magnitude of
undistorted mining can be achieved.
1 Introduction
The knowledge models produced through data mining techniques are only as good as the accuracy
of their input data. One source of data inaccuracy is when users deliberately provide wrong infor-
mation. This is especially common with regard to customers who are asked to provide personal
information on Web forms to e-commerce service providers. The compulsion for doing so may be
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the (perhaps well-founded) worry that the requested information may be misused by the service
provider to harass the customer. As a case in point, consider a pharmaceutical company that asks
clients to disclose the diseases they have suffered from in order to investigate the correlations in
their occurrences – for example, “Adult females with malarial infections are also prone to contract
tuberculosis”. While the company may be acquiring the data solely for genuine data mining pur-
poses that would eventually reflect itself in better service to the client, at the same time the client
might worry that if her medical records are either inadvertently or deliberately disclosed, it may
adversely affect her employment opportunities.
Recently, in [11], we investigated (for the first time) whether customers can be encouraged to
provide correct information by ensuring that the mining process cannot, with any reasonable degree
of certainty, violate their privacy, but at the same time produce sufficiently accurate mining results.
The difficulty in achieving these goals is that privacy and accuracy are typically contradictory in
nature, with the consequence that improving one usually incurs a cost in the other [2].
Our study was carried out in the context of extracting association rules from large historical
databases, a popular mining process [3] that identifies interesting correlations between database
attributes, such as the one described in the pharmaceutical example. For this framework, we pre-
sented a scheme called MASK, (Mining Associations with Secrecy Konstraints), based on a simple
probabilistic distortion of user data, employing random numbers generated from a pre-defined dis-
tribution function. It is this distorted information that is eventually supplied to the data miner,
along with a description of the distortion procedure. A special feature of MASK is that the dis-
tortion process can be implemented at the data source itself, that is, at the user machine. This
increases the confidence of the user in providing accurate information since she does not have to
trust a third-party to distort the data before it is acquired by the service provider.
Experimental evaluation of MASK on a variety of synthetic and real datasets showed that, by
appropriate setting of the distortion parameters, it was possible to simultaneously achieve a high
degree of privacy and retain a high degree of accuracy in the mining results. While these results
were very encouraging, a problem left unaddressed was characterizing the runtime efficiency of
mining the distorted data as compared to directly mining the original data. That is, the question
“Is privacy-preserving mining of association rules more expensive than direct mining?” was not
considered in detail. Our subsequent analysis has shown that this issue is indeed a major concern:
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Specifically, we have found that on typical market-basket databases, privacy-preserving mining can
take as much as two to three orders of magnitude more time as compared to direct mining. Such
enormous overheads raise serious questions about the viability of supporting privacy concerns in
data mining environments.
In this paper, we address the runtime efficiency issue in privacy-preserving association rule
mining, which to the best of our knowledge has never been previously considered in the literature.
Within this framework, our contributions are the following:
• We show that there are inherent reasons as to why mining the distorted database is a signifi-
cantly harder exercise as compared to directly mining the original database.
• We demonstrate that it is possible to bring the efficiency to well within an order of magnitude
with respect to direct mining, while retaining satisfactory privacy and accuracy levels. This
improvement is achieved through changes in both the distortion process and the mining
process of MASK, resulting in a new algorithm that we refer to as EMASK. In EMASK,
the distortion process is generalized to perform symbol-specific distortion – that is, different
distortion parameters are used for 1’s and 0’s in a transaction.(1 indicates the presence of
an item and 0 indicates the absence of an item in a transaction). Estimation procedures
are designed to carefully chose the parameters of distortion beforehand and a variety of
optimizations are applied in the mining process to achieve the desired goals. Our new design
is validated against a variety of synthetic and real datasets.
• In MASK, privacy is measured with respect to the ability to directly reconstruct entries in the
distorted matrix. We refer to this hereafter as “basic privacy”. In EMASK, we consider basic
privacy as well as “reinterrogated privacy” – this latter notion captures the situation wherein
the miner is permitted to utilize the mining output (i.e. the association rules) to reinterrogate
the distorted matrix, potentially resulting in reduced privacy.
1.1 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the privacy frame-
work employed in our study, while Section 3 provides background information about the origi-
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nal MASK algorithm. Then, in Section 4, we present the details of our new EMASK privacy-
preserving scheme. The performance model and the experimental results are highlighted in Sec-
tions 5 and 6, respectively. Related work on privacy-preserving mining is reviewed in Section 7.
Finally, in Section 8, we summarize the conclusions of our study.
2 Problem Framework
2.1 Database Model
We assume that each customer contributes a tuple to the database with the tuple being a fixed-
length sequence of 1’s and 0’s. A typical example of such a database is the so-called “market-
basket” database [3] wherein the columns represent the items sold by a supermarket, and each
row describes, through a sequence of 1’s and 0’s, the purchases made by a particular customer (1
indicates a purchase and 0 indicates no purchase). We also assume that the overall number of 1’s
in the database is significantly smaller than the number of 0’s – this is especially true for market-
baskets since each customer typically buys only a small fraction of all the items available in the
store. In short, the database is modeled as a large disk-resident two-dimensional sparse boolean
matrix.
Note that the boolean representation is only logical and that the database tuples may actually be
physically stored as “item-lists”, that is, as an ordered list of the identifiers of the items purchased
in the transaction. The list representation may appear preferable for the sparse databases that we
are considering, since it reduces the space requirement as compared to storing entire bit-vectors.
However, because we are distorting user information, it may be the case that the distorted matrix
will not be as sparse as the true database. Therefore, in this paper, we assume that the distorted
database is stored as a large collection of bit-vectors.
2.2 Mining Objectives
The goal of the miner is to compute association rules on the above database. Denoting the set of
transactions in the database by T and the set of items in the database by I, an association rule is a
(statistical) implication of the form X =⇒ Y , where X ,Y ⊂ I and X ∩Y = φ. A ruleX =⇒ Y is
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said to have a support (or frequency) factor s iff at least s% of the transactions in T satisfy X ∪Y .
A rule X =⇒ Y is satisfied in the set of transactions T with a confidence factor c iff at least c%
of the transactions in T that satisfy X also satisfy Y . Both support and confidence are fractions
in the interval [0,1]. The support is a measure of statistical significance, whereas confidence is a
measure of the strength of the rule.
A rule is said to be “interesting” if its support and confidence are greater than user-defined
thresholds supmin and conmin, respectively, and the objective of the mining process is to find all
such interesting rules. It has been shown in [3] that achieving this goal is effectively equivalent
to generating all subsets X of I that have support greater than supmin – these subsets are called
frequent itemsets. Therefore, the mining objective is, in essence, to efficiently discover all frequent
itemsets that are present in the database.
2.3 Privacy Metric
As mentioned earlier, the mechanism adopted in this paper for achieving privacy is to distort the
user data before it is subject to the mining process. Accordingly, we measure privacy with regard
to the probability with which distorted entries can be reconstructed. In short, our privacy metric is:
“With what probability can a random 1 or 0 in the true matrix be reconstructed”? For the sake of
presentation simplicity, we will assume in the sequel that the user is only interested in privacy for
1’s (this appears reasonable to expect in a market-basket environment, since the 1’s denote specific
actions, whereas the 0’s are default options). The generalization to providing privacy for both 1’s
and 0’s is straightforward – the details are given in [1].
Privacy can be computed at two levels: Basic Privacy (BP) and Re-interrogated Privacy (RP).
In basic privacy, we assume that the miner does not have access to the distorted data matrix after
the completion of the mining process. Whereas, in re-interrogated privacy, the miner can use the
mining output (i.e. the association rules) to subsequently re-interrogate the distorted database,
possibly resulting in reduced privacy.
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3 Background on MASK
We present here background information on the MASK algorithm, which we recently proposed in
[11] for providing acceptable levels of both privacy and accuracy.
Given a customer tuple with 1’s and 0’s, the MASK algorithm has a simple distortion process:
Each item value (i.e. 1 or 0) is either kept the same with probability p or is flipped with probability
1 − p. All the customer tuples are distorted in this fashion and make up the database supplied to
the miner – in effect, the miner receives a probabilistic function of the true customer database. For
this distortion process, the Basic Privacy for 1’s was computed to be
R1(p) =
s0×p2
s0×p+(1−s0)×(1−p)
+ s0×(1−p)
2
s0×(1−p)+(1−s0)×p
(1)
where s0 is the average support of individual items in the database and p is the distortion parameter
mentioned above.
Since the privacy graph as a function of p has a large range where it is almost constant, it
means that we have considerable flexibility in choosing the p value – in particular, we can choose
it in a manner that will minimize the error in the subsequent mining process. Specifically, the
experiments in [11] showed that choosing p = 0.9 (or, equivalently, p = 0.1, since the graph is
symmetric about p = 0.5) was most conducive to accuracy.
The concept of Re-interrogated Privacy was not considered in [11]; we include it in this paper
and compute both Basic Privacy and Re-interrogated Privacy for EMASK (see Section 4.1.1 for
details).
4 The EMASK Algorithm
Our motivation for the EMASK algorithm stems from the fact that while MASK is successful in
obtaining the dual objectives of privacy and accuracy, its runtime efficiency proves to be rather
poor. To motivate the cause for this inefficiency, let us look at the performance numbers of a
sample database. Figure 1 shows the running time (on log scale) of MASK as compared to Apriori
for a synthetic database generated with IBM Synthetic Data generator (T10.I4.D1M.N1K as per
naming convention of [4]). The figure shows that there are huge differences in running times of the
two algorithms – specifically, mining the distorted database can take as much as two to three orders
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of magnitude more time than mining the original database. Obviously, such enormous overheads
make it difficult for MASK to be viable in practice.
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Figure 1: Comparison of run time of Apriori and MASK (log scale)
The reason for the huge overheads are the following:
Increased database density: This overhead is inherent to the methods employing random dis-
tortion method to achieve privacy. The random perturbation methods flip 0’s to 1’s to hide
the original 1’s. Due to the generation of false 1’s, the density of the database matrix is
increased considerably. For example, given a supermarket database with an average trans-
action length of 10 over a 1000 item inventory, a flipping probability as low as 0.1 increases
the average transaction length by an order of magnitude, i.e. from 10 to 108. The reason
that flipping of true 1’s to false 0’s cannot compensate for this increase is that the datasets
we are considering here are sparse databases, with the number of 0’s orders of magnitude
larger than the number of 1’s. Hence the effect of flipping 0’s highly dominates the effect of
flipping 1’s.
As a result of increased transaction lengths, counting the itemsets in the distorted database
requires much more processing as compared to the original database, substantially increasing
the mining time. In [9], a technique for compressing large transactions is proposed – how-
ever, its utility is primarily in reducing storage and communication cost, and not in reducing
the mining runtime since the compressed transactions have to be decompressed during the
mining process.
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Counting Overhead: On distortion, a k-itemset may produce any of 2k combinations. For exam-
ple, a ’11’ may distort to ’00’,’01’,’10’ or ’11’. In order to accurately reconstruct the support
of the k-itemset, we need to, in principle, keep track of the counts of all 2k combinations.
To reduce these costs, MASK took the approach of maintaining equal flipping probabilities
for both 1’s and 0’s – with this assumption, the number of counters required is only k [11].
Further, only k−1 of the counts need to be explicitly maintained since the sum of the counts
is equal to the database cardinality, dbsize – the counter chosen to be implicitly counted was
the one with the expected largest count.
While the above counting optimizations did appreciably reduce runtime costs, yet the over-
head in absolute terms remains very significant – as mentioned earlier, it could be as much
as two to three orders of magnitude compared to the time taken for direct mining.
In the remainder of this section, we describe how EMASK is engineered to address the above
efficiency concerns.
4.1 The Distortion Process
The new feature of EMASK’s distortion process is that it applies symbol-specific distortion – that
is, 1’s are flipped with probability (1− p), while 0’s are flipped with probability (1− q). Note that
in this framework the original MASK can be viewed as a special case of EMASK wherein p = q.
The idea here is that MASK generates false items to hide the true items that are retained after
distortion, resulting in an increase in database density. But, if a fewer number of true items are
retained, a fewer number of false items need to be generated, and we can minimize this density
increase. Thus the goal of reduced density could be achieved by reducing the value of p and
increasing the value of q (specifically increasing it to beyond 0.9). However, note that a decrease
in p value increases the distortion significantly which can reduce accuracy of reconstruction. Also,
q or the non-flipping probability of 0s cannot be increased to very high values as it can decrease the
privacy significantly. Thus the choices of p and q have to be made carefully to obtain a combination
of p and q values, such that q is high enough to result in decreased transaction lengths but privacy
and accuracy are still achievable.
We defer the discussion on how to select appropriate values of p and q to Section 4.4.
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4.1.1 Privacy Estimation for EMASK
As mentioned earlier, privacy can be computed at two levels: Basic Privacy (BP) and Reinterro-
gated Privacy (RP). We now quantify the privacy provided by EMASK with regard to both these
metrics.
4.1.2 Basic Privacy
The basic privacy measures the probability that given a random customer C who bought an item
i, her original entry for i, i.e. ’1’, can be accurately reconstructed from the distorted entry, prior
to the mining process. We can calculate this privacy in the following manner, similar to the pro-
cedure outlined for MASK in [11]: Let si be the support of the ith item, Xi be the original entry
corresponding to item i, in a tuple and Yi be its distorted entry. The reconstruction probability of a
1 is given by
R1(p, q, si) = Pr(Yi = 1|Xi = 1)Pr(Xi = 1|Yi = 1) + Pr(Yi = 0|Xi = 1)Pr(Xi = 1|Yi = 0)
=
Pr(Yi = 1|Xi = 1)
2 Pr(Xi = 1)
Pr(Yi = 1)
+
Pr(Yi = 0|Xi = 1)
2 Pr(Xi = 1)
Pr(Yi = 0)
=
p2si
Pr(Yi = 1)
+
(1− p)2si
Pr(Yi = 0)
But,
Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(Yi = 1|Xi = 0)Pr(Xi = 0) + Pr(Yi = 1|Xi = 1)Pr(Xi = 1)
= sip+ (1− si)(1− q)
And,
Pr(Yi = 0) = 1− Pr(Yi = 1) = si(1− p) + (1− si)q
Therefore,
R1(p, q, si) =
p2si
sip+ (1− si)(1− q)
+
(1− p)2si
si(1− p) + (1− si)q
The overall reconstruction probability of 1’s is now given by
R1(p, q) =
∑
i siR1(p, q, si)∑
i si
and the Basic privacy offered to 1’s is simply 100(1− R1(p, q)).
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The above expression is minimized when all the items in the database have the same support,
and increases with the variance in the supports across items. As discussed later in Section 6,
with the appropriate choices of p and q, this increase is marginal for the market-basket type of
datasets that we consider here. Therefore, as a first-level approximation, we replace the item-
specific supports in the above equation by s0, the average support of an item in the database. With
this, the reconstruction probability simplifies to
R1(p, q) =
p2s0
s0p+(1−s0)(1−q)
+ (1−p)
2s0
s0(1−p)+(1−s0)q
(2)
In Figure 2 we plot 100(1 − R1(p, q)) i.e. privacy for different values of p and q at s0=0.01 –
the shadings indicate the privacy ranges. Note that the color of each square represents the privacy
value of the lower left corner of the square. We observe here that there is a band of values for p and
q in which the privacy is greater than the 80% mark. Specifically, for q between 0.1 and 0.9, high
privacy values are attainable for all p values, and the whole of this region appears black. Beyond
q = 0.9, privacy above 80% is attainable but only for low p values. Similarly for q below 0.1, high
privacy can be obtained only at high p values.
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Figure 2: Basic Privacy of EMASK
4.1.3 Reinterrogation privacy
Reinterrogation privacy takes into account the reduction in privacy due to the knowledge of the
output of the mining process – namely, the association rules, or equivalently, the support of frequent
itemsets [4]. Privacy breach due to reinterrogation stems from the fact that an individual entry in
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the distorted database may not reveal enough information to reconstruct it, but on seeing a long
frequent itemset in the distorted database and knowing the distorted and original supports of the
itemset one may be able to predict the presence of an item of the itemset with more certainty.
As an example situation, suppose the reconstructed support of a 3-itemset present in a transaction
distorted with p = 0.9, q = 0.9, is 0.01. Then the probabiity of this 3-itemset coming from a ’000’
in the original transaction is as low as 0.1 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.99 = 0.00099. Thus, with the knowledge
of support of higher length itemsets the miner can predict the presence of an item of the itemset in
the original transaction with higher probability.
Our method of estimating reinterrogation privacy breach is based on that described in [8] for
computing privacy breaches. We make the extremely conservative assumption here that the data
miner is able to accurately estimate the exact supports of the original database during the mining
process. The method of calculating reinterrogation privacy is as follows:
• First, for each item that is part of a frequent itemset, we compare the support of the frequent
itemset in the distorted data with the support of the singleton item in the original data. For
example, let an itemset {a,b,c} occur a hundred times in the randomized data and let the
support of the item b in the corresponding hundred transactions of the original database
be twenty. We then say that the itemset {a,b,c} caused a 20% privacy breach for item b
due to reinterrogation, since for these hundred distorted transactions, we estimate with 20%
confidence that the item b was present in the original transaction.
• Then, we estimate the privacy of each ’1’ appearing in a frequent item column in the original
database. There are two cases: 1’s that have remained 1’s in the distorted database, and 1’s
that have been flipped to 0’s. For the former, the privacy is estimated with regard to the worst
of the privacy breaches (computed as discussed above) among all the frequent itemsets of
which it is a part and which appear in the distorted version of this transaction. For example,
for an item b in the original transaction {a,b,c,d,e}, the privacy breach of b is the worst of the
privacy breaches due to all frequent itemsets which are subsets of {a,b,c,d,e} and contain b.
In the latter (flip) case, the privacy is set equal to the average Basic Privacy value – this is
because for the q values that we consider in this paper, which are close to 1.0 as discussed
later, most of the large number of 0’s in the original sparse matrix remain 0, so a 1 flipping
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to a 0 is resistant to privacy breaches due to reinterrogation.
• Next, for the 1’s present in in-frequent columns, the privacy is estimated to be the Basic
Privacy since these privacies are not affected by the discovery of frequent itemsets.
• Finally, the above privacy estimates are averaged over all 1’s in the original database to
obtain the overall average reinterrogation privacy.
4.2 The EMASK Mining Process
Having established the privacy obtained by EMASK’s distortion process, we now move on to
presenting EMASK’s technique for estimating the true supports of itemsets from the distorted
database. In the following discussion, we first show how to estimate the supports of 1-itemsets (i.e.
singletons) and then present the general n-itemset support estimation procedure. In this derivation,
it is important to keep in mind that the miner is provided with both the distorted matrix as well as
the distortion procedure, that is, he knows the values of p and q that were used in distorting the true
matrix.
4.2.1 Estimating Singleton supports
We denote the original true matrix by T and the distorted matrix, obtained with distortion parame-
ters p and q, as D. Now consider a random individual item i. Let cT1 and cT0 represent the number
of 1’s and 0’s, respectively, in the i column of T , while cD1 and cD0 represent the number of 1’s and
0’s, respectively, in the i column of D. With this notation, we estimate the support of i in T using
the following equation:
C
T = M−1CD (3)
where
M =


p 1− q
1− p q

 CD =


cD1
cD0

 CT =


cT1
cT0


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4.2.2 Estimating n-itemset Supports
It is easy to extend Equation 3, which is applicable to individual items, to compute the support for
an arbitrary n-itemset. For this general case, we define the matrices as:
CD =


cD2n−1
.
.
.
cD1
cD0


CT =


cT2n−1
.
.
.
cT1
cT0


Here cTk should be interpreted as the count of the tuples in T that have the binary form of k (in n
digits) for the given itemset (that is, for a 2-itemset, cT2 refers to the count of 10’s in the columns
of T corresponding to that itemset, cT3 to the count of 11’s, and so on). Similarly, cDk is defined for
the distorted matrix D.
The column matrices can be simplified by observing that the distortion of an entry in the above
distortion procedure depends only on whether the entry is 0 or 1, and not on the column to which
the entry belongs, rendering distortion of all combinations with same number of 1s and 0s equiva-
lent. Hence the above matrices can be represented as:
CD =


cDn
.
.
.
cD1
cD0


CT =


cTn
.
.
.
cT1
cT0


where cTk should be interpreted as the count of the tuples in T that have the binary form with k
1’s (in n digits) for the given itemset. For example , for a 2-itemset, cT2 refers to the count of 11’s
in the columns of T corresponding to that itemset, cT1 to the count of 10’s and 01’s, and cT0 to the
count of 00’s. Similarly, cDk is defined for the distorted matrix D.
Each entry mi,j in the matrix M is the probability that a tuple of the form corresponding to cTj
in T goes to a tuple of the form corresponding to cDi in D. For example, m2,1 for a 2-itemset is
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the probability that a 10 or 01 tuple distorts to a 11 tuple. Accordingly, m2,1 = p(1− q). The basis
for this formulation lies in the fact that in our distortion procedure, the component columns of an
n-itemset are distorted independently. Therefore, we can use the product of the probability terms.
In general,
mi,j =
min(i,j)∑
k=max(0,i+j−n)
jCk p
k(1− p)(i−k) n−jCi−k q
(n+k−i−j)(1− q)(i−k) (4)
4.3 Eliminating Counting Overhead
We now present a simple but powerful optimization by which the entire extra overhead of counting
all the combinations generated by the distortion can be eliminated completely. This optimization
is based on the following basic formula from set theory: Given a universe U , and subsets A and B,
N(A′ ∩B) = N(B)−N(A ∩B)
where N is the number of elements, i.e. cardinality, of the set denoted by the bracketed expression.
This formula can be generalized1 to
N(A′1A
′
2...A
′
mB1B2...Bn)
= N(B1B2..Bn) +
m∑
k=1
∑
{x1,...,xk}⊂{1,...,m}
(−1)kN(Ax1Ax2...AxkB1B2..Bn)
Using above formula the counts of all the combinations generated from an n-itemset can be calcu-
lated from the counts of itemsets and the counts of their subsets which are available from previous
passes over the distorted database. Hence, we only need to explicitly count only the ’111...1’s, just
as in the direct mining case.
For example, during the second pass we need to explicitly count only ’11’s which makesN(A∩
B) available at the end of the second pass. The counts of the remaining combinations, ’10’, ’01’
and ’00’ can then be calculated using the following set of formulae:
10 : N(A ∩B′) = N(A)−N(A ∩B)
01 : N(A′ ∩ B) = N(B)−N(A ∩B)
00 : N(A′ ∩ B′) = N(D)−N(A)−N(B) +N(A ∩B)
1N(B1B2..Bn) is replaced by N(U) if n = 0
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The above implies that the extra calculations for reconstruction are performed only at the end of
each pass, the rest of the pass being exactly the same as that of the original mining algorithm.
Further, the only additional requirement of the above approach as compared to traditional data
mining algorithms such as Apriori is that we need to have available, at the end of each pass, the
counts of all frequent itemsets generated during the previous passes. However, this requirement is
easily met by keeping a hash table in memory of these previously identified frequent itemsets.
4.4 Choosing values of p and q
As promised earlier, we now discuss how the distortion parameters, p and q, should be chosen.
Our goal here is to identify those parameter settings that simultaneously ensure acceptable levels
of both privacy and accuracy. We use privacy and accuracy estimations to choose these values. The
average support value of the dataset are required for these estimations. We assume here that some
initial sample data is available based on which the determination of average support value can be
made.
Earlier in this section, we had shown how the basic privacy can be calculated. We use the basic
privacy values as the estimation for privacy achievable at a point (p,q) as the basic privacy can
be calculated before distortion. We now describe how to estimate the accuracy of reconstruction
beforehand. Our focus is specifically on 1-itemsets since their error percolates through the entire
mining process.
Consider a single column in the true database which has n 1’s and dbsize − n 0’s. We expect
that the n 1’s will distort to np 1’s and n(1 − p) 0’s when distorted with parameter p. Similarly,
we expect the 0’s to go to (dbsize − n)q 0’s and (dbsize − n)(1 − q) 1’s. However, note that this
is assuming that “When we generate a random number, which is distributed as bernoulli(p), then
the number of 1’s, denoted by P, in n trials is actually np”. But, in reality, this will not be so.
Actually, P is distributed as binomial(n,p), with mean np and variance np(1− p).
The total number of 1’s in a column of the distorted matrix can be expressed as the sum of two
random variables, X and Y :
• X: The 1’s in the distorted database that come from 1’s in the original database.
• Y : The 1’s in the distorted database that come from 0’s in the original database.
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The variance in the total number of 1’s generated in the distorted matrix is var(X + Y ), which is
simply var(X)+ var(Y ) since X and Y are independent random variables. So, we have var(X+
Y ) = var(X) + var(Y ) = np(1 − p) + (dbsize − n)(1 − q)q. Therefore, the deviation of the
number of 1’s in the distorted database from the expected value is
△n′ = (np(1− p) + (dbsize− n)(1− q)q)1/2 (5)
Let the distorted column have n ′ 1’s. Then, our estimate of the original count is given by
n =
n′
p+ q − 1
−
(1− q)dbsize
p+ q − 1
and the possible error in this estimation is computed as
△n =
△n′
p+ q − 1
where △n′ is as per Equation 5. If we normalize the error to the true value (n), we obtain
Error =
(p(1− p) + (dbsize
n
− 1)(1− q)q)1/2
p+ q − 1
(6)
which is completely expressed in terms of known parameters.
Using Equations 2 and 6, we can set the p and q parameters so as to achieve reasonable privacy
and accuracy goals.
5 Performance Framework
EMASK aims at simultaneously achieving satisfactory performance on three objectives: privacy,
accuracy and efficiency. While privacy is determined as outlined in Section 4.1.1, the specific
metrics used to evaluate EMASK’s performance w.r.t. accuracy and efficiency are given below.
5.1 Accuracy Metrics
We evaluate two kinds of mining errors, Support Error and Identity Error, in our experiments:
Support Error (ρ) :
This metric reflects the (percentage) average relative error in the reconstructed support val-
ues for those itemsets that are correctly identified to be frequent. Denoting the number of
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frequent itemsets by |f |, the reconstructed support by rec sup and the actual support by
act sup, the support error is computed over all frequent itemsets as
ρ =
1
| f |
Σf
| rec supf − act supf |
act supf
∗ 100
Identity Error (σ) :
This metric reflects the percentage error in identifying frequent itemsets and has two compo-
nents: σ+, indicating the percentage of false positives, and σ− indicating the percentage of
false negatives. Denoting the reconstructed set of frequent itemsets with R and the correct
set of frequent itemsets with F , these metrics are computed as:
σ+ = |R−F |
|F |
∗ 100 σ− = |F−R|
|F |
* 100
5.2 Efficiency Metric
This metric determines the runtime overheads resulting from mining the distorted database as com-
pared to the time taken to mine the original database. This is simply measured as the inverse ratio
of the running times between Apriori on the original database and executing the same code aug-
mented with EMASK (i.e. EMASK-Apriori) on the distorted database. Denoting this slowdown
ratio as ∆, we have
∆ = RunTime of EMASKApriori
RunT ime of Apriori
For ease of presentation, we hereafter refer to this augmented algorithm simply as EMASK.
5.3 Data Sets
We carried out experiments on a variety of synthetic and real datasets. Due to space limitations,
we report the results for only two representative databases here:
1. A synthetic database generated from the IBM Almaden generator [4]. The synthetic database
was created with parameters T10.I4.D1M.N1K (as per the naming convention of [4]), result-
ing in a million customer tuples with each customer purchasing about ten items on average.
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2. A real dataset, BMS-WebView-1 [15], placed in the public domain by Blue Martini Software.
This database contains click-stream data from the web site of a (now defunct) legwear and
legcare retailer. There are about 60,000 tuples with close to 500 items in the schema. In
order to ensure that our results were applicable to large disk-resident databases, we scaled
this database by a factor of ten, resulting in approximately 0.6 million tuples.
5.4 Support and Distortion settings
The theoretical basis for determining the settings of the distortion parameters, p and q, was pre-
sented in Section 4.4. We now utilize those formulas to derive acceptable choices for the datasets
mentioned above. The privacy and accuracy estimates for p values ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 and
q values ranging from 0.9 to 0.99 are shown in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) for support=0.01 (the
synthetic dataset) and support=0.005 (real dataset), respectively. In these figures, the symbol o
represents p, q combinations for which the basic privacy is above a minimum threshold value,
while the symbol x represents combinations for which the accuracy is above a minimum threshold
value. The threshold for basic privacy was set at 90% while the threshold chosen for accuracy
was that produced by the original MASK algorithm, that is, the accuracy estimate obtained with
p = 0.9, q = 0.92.
The points in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) which have both symbols (i.e. o and x) represent p, q
combinations that have both good privacy and accuracy. For example, p = 0.5, q = 0.97 is such a
combination in both figures. From among this set of points, we select only those combinations in
which q is greater than 0.95 – this is because, as mentioned earlier, from an efficiency perspective
we would like to have q as high as possible since it directly impacts the density of the distorted
database.
With the above considerations in mind, the shortlist of candidate combinations is shown in
Tables 1 and 2 for synthetic and real datasets, respectively. The fact that the real dataset has a
richer set of candidates than the synthetic dataset is in accordance with the observation in [11] that
the sparser the dataset, the more amenable it is to privacy-preserving mining.
2Choosing this threshold instead of a fixed value allows adaptation to the characteristics of the specific data set that
is being mined.
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p q
0.3 0.99
0.4 0.98
0.5 0.97
0.6 0.96
Table 1: Candidate p, q combinations for synthetic database
p q p q
0.3 0.99 0.6 0.98
0.4 0.99 0.6 0.97
0.4 0.98 0.6 0.96
0.5 0.98 0.7 0.97
0.5 0.97 0.7 0.96
Table 2: Candidate p, q combinations for real database
6 Experimental Results
We evaluated the privacy, accuracy and efficiency of the EMASK privacy-preserving mining pro-
cess for the candidate distortion parameters on the two datasets for a variety of minimum support
values. Due to space limitations, we present here the results only for 0.3% supmin value, which
represents a support low enough for a large number of frequent itemsets to be produced, thereby
stressing the performance of the EMASK algorithm. The results for the synthetic database are
presented first, followed by those for the real database.
6.1 Experiment Set 1 : Synthetic Dataset
Mining the synthetic dataset with a supmin of 0.3 resulted in frequent itemsets of length upto 8.
Table 3 presents the EMASK privacy, accuracy and efficiency results for this dataset in a summa-
rized fashion. In this table, for each p, q candidate, BP and RP denote the basic and re-interrogated
privacies, respectively; ∆ denotes the slowdown of EMASK; and the remaining columns show the
accuracy metrics. We also include the variances (across mining levels) of the accuracy metrics to
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Figure 3: Determining Acceptable p, q Candidates
determine whether the accuracy was skewed based on the lengths of the frequent itemsets.
p q BP RP ∆ σ+ σ− ρ V ar(σ+) V ar(σ−) V ar(ρ)
0.6 0.96 92 70 5.2 4.99 5.34 3.39 3.23 6.84 0.27
0.5 0.97 92.6 74 3.8 5.64 6.27 4.86 7.74 6.41 4.31
0.4 0.98 93 78 2.4 6.40 7.87 6.60 6.13 18.35 19.02
0.3 0.99 92.6 80 1.1 6.63 11.69 10.19 7.61 137.20 120.24
Table 3: Performance Results for Synthetic dataset
The first point to note in Table 3 is that the results are very encouraging since they clearly
demonstrate that EMASK is able to get high values for all three competing objectives – for ex-
ample, with (0.4, 0.98), the basic and re-interrogated privacy are above 75 percent, the slowdown
is only 2.4 (that is, it performed only around twice as slow as Apriori), and the accuracy on all
measures is better than 90 percent (less than 10 percent error).
Secondly, note that the ∆ slowdown values across all the combinations is such that EMASK
always performs within 5 times of Apriori. This is indeed a huge improvement from the several
orders of magnitude inefficiency that was exhibited by MASK, as discussed earlier in Section 4.
Third, while it may appear that (0.3, 0.99) is very desirable from privacy and efficiency per-
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spectives (it executes almost as quickly as Apriori and has an 80-plus privacy), yet it may not be a
suitable choice since the variance in the accuracy measures is very high. Specifically, the longer
(and potentially most important) frequent itemsets have much higher errors with the combinations
with low p values like this. Table 4 and Table 5 show errors at each level for 0.6, 0.96 (highest p
value in the candidates) and 0.3, 0.99 (lowest p value) respectively. In the tables, the Level indi-
cates the length of the frequent itemsets, |F | indicates the number of frequent itemset at this level,
and other three columns are error metrics as discussed before. The tables indicate that to ensure
high accuracy at higher levels one must move to high p values among the candidate combinations.
Level |F | σ+ σ− ρ
1 664 1.5 1.5 3.21
2 1847 5.79 5.46 3.38
3 1310 3.66 4.27 2.9
4 864 7.29 6.13 3.45
5 419 6.2 12.88 4.35
6 115 6.08 4.34 5.44
7 21 4.76 4.76 6.86
8 2 0 0 5.39
Table 4: p=0.6,q=0.96,supmin=0.3%
Finally, since no single combination is the best in all respects, the specific tradeoffs between
privacy, accuracy and efficiency have to be determined by the service provider to suit her require-
ments. Among the chosen candidates for p, q, moving to higher p values gives better accuracy,
moving to lower p values gives better privacy and moving to higher q values gives better effi-
ciency. But,the important point is that no matter which of these combinations is chosen, they all
provide 70-plus privacy, 80-plus accuracy, and slowdown less than 5.
6.2 Experiment Set 2: Real Dataset
We conducted a similar set of experiments on the real dataset (BMS-WebView-1 [15]), which had
frequent itemsets of length upto 4 for 0.3% minimum support setting. The results for this set of
experiments are shown in Table 6.
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Level |F | σ+ σ− ρ
1 664 0.75 1.95 3.11
2 1847 7.95 6.93 5.09
3 1310 7.63 7.63 8.16
4 864 8.91 16.31 14.29
5 419 4.53 35.56 26.18
6 115 0 53.91 46.81
7 21 0 85.71 123.04
8 2 0 100 0
Table 5: p=0.3,q=0.99,supmin=0.3%
The first point to note in Table 6 is that the privacy and accuracy results are noticeably better
than their counterparts in the synthetic dataset experiment. On the other hand, the slowdown
values are marginally higher. This is because Apriori is able to take full advantage of the increased
sparseness of this dataset, whereas EMASK still has to pay a price for the density increases that are
an outcome of the distortion process. Secondly, there are a richer set of tradeoffs that are available
to the service provider to suit her requirements. Finally, note again that setting very high values of
q, specifically q = 0.99, while very attractive from privacy and efficiency perspectives, results in
high variance for the accuracy measures. Here too, the errors are primarily incurred by the longer
frequent itemsets.
6.3 Summary
Overall, our experiments indicate that by a careful choice of distortion parameter settings, it is
possible to simultaneously achieve satisfactory privacy, accuracy, and efficiency. In particular,
they show that there is a “window of opportunity” where these triple goals can be all met. The
size and position of the window is primarily a function of the database density and could be quite
accurately characterized with our estimation methods.
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p q BP RP ∆ σ+ σ− ρ V ar(σ+) V ar(σ−) V ar(ρ)
0.8 0.96 92.7 71 4.8 3.21 3.67 3.21 2.34 1.67 0.67
0.7 0.96 94.3 76 4.8 4.13 3.90 3.86 6.45 1.46 0.65
0.6 0.96 95.8 81.4 4.8 5.05 5.28 4.80 11.96 4.47 0.42
0.6 0.97 94.5 78 3.7 4.36 4.36 4.08 10.13 1.47 0.24
0.7 0.97 92.7 73 3.6 2.98 3.67 3.34 3.05 1.67 0.36
0.6 0.98 92.1 74 2.5 3.67 3.67 3.30 3.03 3.21 0.16
0.5 0.98 94.3 79.5 2.4 4.36 4.82 4.35 3.50 11.53 0.20
0.4 0.98 96.2 85.7 2.7 6.43 6.66 5.97 26.63 14.24 0.56
0.4 0.99 93.2 79.3 1.6 5.28 5.05 4.78 15.40 16.50 1.34
0.3 0.99 96 87 1.3 8.96 7.81 6.29 201.96 33.20 1.51
Table 6: Performance Results for Real Dataset
7 Related Work
The issue of maintaining privacy in association rule mining has attracted considerable attention in
the recent past [12, 6, 7, 13, 14, 10, 8, 9]. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these
previous papers have tackled the issue of efficiency in privacy-preserving mining.
The work closest to our approach is that of [8, 9]. A set of randomization operators for main-
taining data privacy were presented and analyzed in [8]. New formulations of privacy breaches
and a methodology for limiting them were given in [9]. The problem of large transactions result-
ing from distortion was also mentioned in [9], but they addressed this problem from the perspective
of reducing storage and communication costs, but not runtime mining efficiency. Specifically, they
proposed a compression technique for reducing the effective size of the distorted database.
Another difference is that EMASK (and MASK) support a notion of “average privacy”, that
is, they compute the probability of being able to accurately reconstruct a random entry in the
database. In contrast, [8, 9] evaluate the probability of accurately reconstructing a specific entry
in the database. In [1], we present a detailed quantitative argument for why it appears fundamen-
tally unlikely that efficient mining algorithms can be designed to support this stronger measure of
privacy.
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Finally, the problem addressed in [12, 6, 7, 13] is how to prevent sensitive rules from being
inferred by the data miner – this work is complementary to ours since it addresses concerns about
output privacy, whereas our focus is on the privacy of the input data. Maintaining input data privacy
is considered in [14, 10] in the context of databases that are distributed across a number of sites
with each site only willing to share data mining results, but not the source data.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered, for the first time, the issue of providing efficiency in privacy-
preserving mining. Our goal was to investigate the possibility of simultaneously achieving high
privacy, accuracy and efficiency in the mining process. We first showed how the distortion process
required for ensuring privacy can have a marked negative side-effect of hugely increasing mining
runtimes. Then, we presented our new EMASK algorithm that is specifically designed to minimize
this side-effect through the application of symbol-specific distortion. We derived simple but effec-
tive formulas for estimating acceptable settings of the distortion parameters. We also presented a
simple but powerful optimization by which all additional counting incurred by privacy preserving
mining is moved to the end of each pass over the database.
Our experiments show that EMASK exploits a small window of opportunity around the distor-
tion combination (p = 0.4, q = 0.98) which can simultaneously provide good privacy, accuracy
and efficiency. Specifically, less than 5 times slowdown with respect to Apriori in conjunction with
70-plus privacies and 80-plus accuracies, were achieved with these settings. In summary, EMASK
takes a significant step towards making privacy-preserving mining of association rules a viable
enterprise.
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